Evading Black-box Classifiers Without Breaking Eggs


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



How can we upload an inappropriate image on Twitter?

We can create an adversarial example, i.e., craft a small perturbation that fools the model!



How can we upload an inappropriate image on Twitter?






How do current label-only attacks work?


Can we use existing evasion attacks to upload an inappropriate image on Twitter? **No.**

- Existing attacks do a lot (100s) of queries that are classified as "bad".
- Any user would get **banned** after very few such queries
- There is an **asymmetric cost** between "good" and "bad" queries




Overall Queries Bad Queries


How do we make attacks stealthier?



Is this enough?



Is this enough? No.



Takeaways

- Only counting the overall number of queries is not enough for many real-world applications
- There is an asymmetric cost between "good" and "bad" queries
- It's possible to stealthy-fy existing attacks, but it comes at a cost in terms of overall queries

We should rethink label-only attacks from scratch

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